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In the rapidly unfolding multipolar world order, an unprecedented number 
of states, international organisations, advocacy groups, and other actors are 
devising and implementing a growing number of interventions to  strengthen 
democracy, peace, and security. The political and normative views on these 
external interventions differ fundamentally.
 • Negative connotations predominate with respect to the term “intervention” in 
the international promotion of democracy, peace, and security. This is mostly 
due to its popular association with military operations, the increasingly blurred 
divide between “the external” and “the internal,” contested legitimacy, and the 
prevailing focus on Western actors. However, a narrow understanding focused 
on military operations leaves aside an increasing variety of less coercive forms 
of intervention. 
 • Differentiating between the various forms, goals, and contexts of intervention is 
a precondition for proper analysis and application. The most  important  factors 
are the actors involved, the mode of operation (coercive vs. less  coercive), and the 
specific targets to be achieved – for instance, the underlying concept of “peace.” 
 • Current trends in the international arena include the ever-increasing number 
of actors, the erosion of dominant norms, the crisis of multilateralism, and the 
decrease in democracy-promotion activities in favour of addressing security 
concerns.
 • Due to the complex nature of international interventions, assessing their effects 
can be frustrating. It is most important to adequately tackle the individual in-
terventions’ contexts and to group similar kinds of intervention. For instance, 
UN peacekeeping, in conjunction with other factors, has often contributed to 
the ending of severe violent conflicts. 
Policy Implications
Western states are no longer the dominant powers when it comes to democracy 
pro motion, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Against this background, pursu-
ing pragmatic approaches to safeguard minimum conditions of democratic gov-
ernance and security seems to be the most feasible option. To properly assess 
individual interventions’ effects, practitioners (and scholars) should make more 
consistent efforts to establish yardsticks and evaluation designs before devising 
specific interventions.
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The Intervention Dilemma
After the democracy-promotion euphoria of the post-Cold War period, attention to 
this intervention area has been in decline for almost two decades. The major focus 
of current interventions appears to rest on peace-, security-, and state-building ac-
tivities, rather than on outright democracy promotion. This tendency is reflected in 
the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 16, which brings together peace, 
security, and governance. However, despite the growing attention these fields are 
receiving from scholars and policymakers alike, knowledge about these interven-
tions’ effects remains scattered across various research strands. 
In particular, critics argue that prominent military interventions lack  legitimacy 
and have detrimental effects, as in the case of Afghanistan, libya, and Iraq. The 
same holds for the purportedly liberal peacebuilding agenda (Paris 2010). More 
generally, international interventions – understood in a broader, not just military 
sense – to increase democracy and security face a fundamental dilemma. On the 
one hand, opponents dismiss them as “hegemonic,” “intrusive,” or counterproduc-
tive. The various intrusions into the Syrian war by the US, russia, Iran, and Turkey, 
among others, have indeed been driven far more by these parties’ own interests 
than by considerations regarding the devastating humanitarian costs of the conflict 
on the people in the country. 
On the other hand, policymakers now devise interventions more often than 
ever, whether through outright military support in Syria, the provision of military 
“advisors” in Uganda, or the strengthening of electoral commissions in emerging 
democracies. The UN currently runs 14 peace operations with more than 110,000 
military, police, and civilian staff in the field. In addition, there are notable regional 
interventions such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which com-
prises 22,000 soldiers and civilians (and is heavily supported by external funders 
such as the european Union), or the european Union rule of law Mission in Ko-
sovo (eUleX Kosovo). However, the UN Security Council, the organ that has the 
sole legitimate power for authorising military intervention, is largely blocked and 
incapable of providing solutions to devastating international security crises such 
as the war in Syria. Only in smaller conflicts where genuine great power interests 
are either absent or converging is multilateralism still working. examples include 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) or the UN sanctions imposed on members of the Al-Qaeda and  Taliban 
terror groups (based on UNSC resolution 1267). 
In order to move the discussion about international intervention forward, it is 
important to distinguish between the various kinds of interventions and to go be-
yond a solely military understanding of intervention. This paper reflects on the con-
tradictory logics, as well as the promises and limits, of international intervention. 
Against the backdrop of the crisis of multilateralism and the inherent limitations 
of interventions, it will be argued that a pragmatic approach to safeguarding the 
minimum conditions for democratic governance and security, rather than liberal 
idealism, represents the most feasible option for devising appropriate international 
interventions to strengthen democracy, peace, and security from the outside.
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Understanding Intervention 
Intervention is a controversial concept that carries different connotations for di-
verse actors in a variety of fields. Yet, some constitutive elements of the action of 
intervention can be discerned. First, it presupposes a divide between the “outside” 
and “inside” of any state or society. Due to globalisation and the increasing inter-
connectedness of societies, this boundary is becoming increasingly blurred, but it 
is still relevant for practical and analytical purposes. Second, intervention is a pur-
poseful action intended to modify the present state of affairs outside one’s own 
borders (in contrast to general processes such as globalisation, or diffusion) – even 
though the exact aim of intervention is often unclear. Third, obviously there are in-
tervention targets, but these are not passive recipients;  rather, they have their own 
“actorness” that moulds or even shapes external intervention (e.g. Jourde 2007). 
Also, the controversial regime-change agenda during the George W. bush presi-
dency (2001–2009) should not divert attention from the fact that most democracy-
promotion programmes are implemented with the knowledge and consent of the 
government in the target state. These activities focus, broadly speaking, on three 
areas: “1) support for institutions and processes crucial to democratic contestation – 
above all, free and fair elections […]; 2) the strengthening and reform of key state 
institutions […] such as parliaments, judiciaries, and local governments; and 3) sup-
port for civil society, usually […] public-interest NGOs, independent media outlets, 
labor unions, and civic-education initiatives” (Carothers 2015: 59). 
Observers of international politics most often couple intervention with the ad-
jective “military” and instantly associate it with the use of coercion by a powerful 
actor against a weaker counterpart. This is reflected in handbook definitions of the 
term, according to which intervention “is most commonly understood to mean the 
use of military force by one country to interfere in the internal affairs of another 
country” but may also “include political interference, economic sanctions, covert 
operations, and even cultural domination” (Robinson 2001: 429). In this sense, ex-
ternal intervention violates the target state’s sovereignty. Due to the popularity this 
view enjoys, it is important to underline that intervention involves power asym-
metries but that not all interventions entail the use of coercion. 
Most fundamentally, intervention – whether it is successful or not – is an inten-
tional process to change the affairs of another state or society. While intervention 
presupposes intention, it differs from indirect influences such as diffusion, which 
occurs without “any collaboration, imposition, or otherwise programmed effort on 
the part of any of the actors” (elkins 2005: 6). In a nutshell, external intervention 
can be understood as purposeful actions outside a state’s own boundaries directed 
towards another state or society, or its related components, with the goal of modify-
ing the situation in or activities of the target. 
Not all Interventions Are Equal
International interventions differ substantially from each other. In order to better 
grasp what they entail in the areas of democracy, peacekeeping, and peacebuild-
ing, it is useful to differentiate between interventions along two axes: the actors 
involved and the mode of operation (see also Table 1).
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Actors Involved: State vs. Non-State 
First, state and non-state actors can devise interventions. In recent years the in-
ternational arena has become much more varied and the number of states and ac-
tors engaging internationally has risen dramatically (Carothers and Samet-Marram 
2015; on rising powers and peacebuilding, Call and Coning 2017). Another impor-
tant distinction to be considered with regard to the intervenors is whether the in-
tervention is a unilateral or a multilateral operation and whether it operates under 
a United Nations Security Council mandate or not. What the mandate allows is a 
further contested issue. This was, for instance, much discussed in relation to UNSC 
Resolution 1973, which gave the parties involved the mandate to establish a no-fly 
zone over libya in March 2011. 
Mode of Operation: Coercive vs. Less Coercive
The most common feature used to differentiate the kinds of interventions is the 
degree of coercion. Classifying intervention measures along this axis is by no means 
unambiguous. Difficulties arise from the delicate question of how to determine when 
encouragement or pressure becomes coercion (Hedeen 2005). While we can easily 
classify cases involving direct physical violence as coercive, those in which media-
tion, negotiation, and arbitration techniques are applied and combined with other 
measures are harder to characterise adequately. Coercion refers to the exertion or 
threatening of violence in order to alter the target’s behaviour. It thus “entails the 
risk of death for citizens of the targeted country as well as the intervening country, 
and the violation of national sovereignty” (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015: 219). 
UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, however, require the consent 
of the target state. Also, most interventions for humanitarian purposes have re-
ceived some consent from the target state, with Kosovo and libya being the main 
exceptions (Welsh 2011). In Welsh’s view, therefore, most multilateral interven-
tions in peace and security “have carried with them standard features of legitimacy: 
a multilateral stamp of approval and/or degree of consent from the target state” 
(Welsh 2016: 2). 
The table categorises the different interventions of states and international or-
ganisations according to the degree of coerciveness. 
Main mode used
Coercive                                                                                                            less coercive
Military “operations”/ war
Forced humanitarian action
Preventive humanitarian action/ 
intervention 
Comprehensive sanctions
Peacekeeping
Targeted economic pressure
Aid conditionality
Individual sanctions
Human rights prosecutions
“Naming and shaming”
Mediation
Arbitration
Diplomatic negotiations
Peacebuilding
The two axes – the main mode used and the main actors involved – may be the most 
pertinent ones, but others are also relevant, depending on the respective  practical 
and research interests. For instance, communication technology is leading, at least 
Table 1.  
Coerciveness of  
Interventions
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in some areas, to a decoupling of intervention and direct spatial encounters be-
tween the intervenors and the intervention targets. Prominent examples include le-
thal drone strikes, bots in social media to affect public opinion and support political 
campaigns, and the Stuxnet computer virus attack that reportedly damaged Iran’s 
nuclear programme in 2010. Thus, we can also differentiate “physical” interven-
tions from digital ones. 
Blurring Divides and Simultaneous Application
The above-mentioned categories are useful for analytical purposes. Yet in practice, 
the fields of action and intervention areas overlap. The lines dividing different kinds 
of intervention are becoming increasingly blurred. This renders their interpretation 
problematic, as it is becoming harder to identify the level of coerciveness – and 
thus, the morality, legality, proportionality, and legitimacy – involved in each. An 
example of this is so-called hybrid warfare. It is characterised by a mixture of clearly 
coercive (e.g. military) and less coercive actions (e.g. the mobilisation of local par-
ties, the manipulation of information, or hacking), including both physical and digi-
tal activities, as carried out, for instance, by russia. These complexities increase the 
challenges involved in evaluating the effects of external interventions in peace and 
security as well as democracy promotion or democracy prevention (von Soest 2015). 
A Pragmatic Approach towards Intervention
The causes of international intervention are manifold and range from “failing and 
collapsed” statehood (Zartman 1995) to the ending of civil wars, the combating of 
terrorism, and regime change, to name just a few extreme examples. Of course, the 
decisions to intervene are strategic and driven by a bundle of considerations and in-
terests (on sanctions, see von Soest and Wahman 2015). Due to the complex nature 
of external interventions, assessing their effects is difficult and can be frustrating. 
As can be seen in the debate about liberal peacebuilding and the so-called local turn, 
the perspectives, assessments, and prescribed forms of intervention vary widely.
Varying Perspectives on External Intervention 
It is often stated that while governments and civil society actors in the North stress 
liberal ideas of human security and interventionism, governments in the so-called 
Global South tend to promote traditional notions of security and state sovereignty. 
Current developments – for instance, the rise of populism in the West as well as 
the democratic commitment of some rising powers and the common security inter-
ests of states – are increasingly calling this purported differentiation into question. 
In the “new global marketplace of political change” (Carothers and Samet-Marram 
2015), Northern states are no longer the dominant powers when it comes to peace-
keeping, peacebuilding, and democracy promotion – for instance, by monitoring 
elections, strengthening parliaments, supporting civil society organisations, and 
strengthening independent media. It is therefore of key importance to comprehen-
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sively assess and differentiate between perspectives in the Global South – which are 
often also bound to specific issue areas – and not to gloss over substantial differ-
ences within this category as is regularly done (Narlikar 2016). 
Understandings of Peace
Among the possible effective “tools,” a continued UN peacekeeping and troop pres-
ence can contribute to a longer absence of violent conflict in (post-)conflict societies 
(Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2016). Foreign military or police forces can deter 
rebellion and encourage targeted states to reduce their military budgets, thereby 
diminishing the likelihood of violent outbreaks. In general, interventions such as 
UN peacekeeping operations have been successful in ending direct hostilities and 
violence – that is, in securing “negative peace.” On the other hand, coercive inter-
ventions have regularly failed to provide more demanding notions of “sustainable,” 
“positive,” or “qualitative” peace (Ansorg and Kurtenbach 2017) – that is, to facili-
tate people living together in a trusting and cooperative way in a society. 
Targets of Intervention 
Intervention is asymmetrical. It is dominated by the intervenor. Yet existing ana-
lyses demonstrate that the effects of external intervention vary considerably. As 
weaker parties are not passive recipients but have varying degrees of “receptivity” 
and may mould external influences to their own advantage (Jourde 2007), the sys-
tematic analysis of the political dynamics within targeted states and societies would 
shed more light on the effects of intervention vis-à-vis those of other domestic and 
structural factors. 
Crises of Legitimacy and the Crisis of Multilateralism 
Despite the fact that at least multilateral interventions in the area of peace and 
democracy are regularly carried out with the knowledge and consent of the target 
state, the term “intervention” immediately evokes resentment. On the one hand, 
this is due to consequentialist reasoning, that intervention in this area rarely attains 
the desired outcomes. Yet, more fundamentally, this critique emphasises inherently 
normative arguments stressing that external, powerful actors should not interfere 
in other, less powerful actors’ affairs, particularly when they do not have a proper 
mandate to do so. As Paris has observed (2014), due to the inherent contradiction 
between altruistic and self-interested motives, legitimacy problems are particularly 
present in humanitarian interventions. In addition, views on “adequate” interven-
tion currently seem to diverge more than ever and the United Nations, as the key 
mechanism of multilateralism, is largely unable to respond to devastating conflicts 
such as the war in Syria. 
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A Pragmatic Approach
There is no global consensus on democracy promotion, peacekeeping, and longer-
term peacebuilding from the outside. Against this background, pursuing pragmatic 
approaches to safeguard minimum conditions of democratic governance and secu-
rity, rather than liberal idealism, appears to be the most feasible option (Moe and 
Stepputat 2018). Most fundamentally, one needs to acknowledge that what external 
actors can achieve is limited. Intervenors might – as is the case for most UN peace-
keeping missions – stop immediate hostilities, but they cannot guide states and 
societies over a longer period. With respect to long-term developments, external 
intervention is only a secondary factor. It can, however, provide a permissive en-
vironment for societal and political transformation. In the long term, for external, 
democratic actors from the North and the South this pragmatic approach would 
mean making sure that fundamental human rights are protected. In the case of 
grave violations, the imposition of external pressure as a last resort would be legiti-
mate, preferably through multilateral means. Devising specific institutional tem-
plates for how a polity is organised would not be part of the package. Concepts such 
as good-enough governance (Grindle 2004) focus on these minimum standards. In 
the realm of peacebuilding this would mean, for instance, focusing on “infrastruc-
tures to peace” – that is, on supporting institutions for the peaceful resolution of local 
conflicts and the constructive interaction of social groups (UNDP 2018; Wolff 2016). 
In order to attain and support these minimum conditions, there is a need for 
consistency across different policy fields. This might often be more important than 
outright, large-scale intervention (Wolff 2016). For instance, Western governments 
must not forego human rights and minimum democratic criteria when they sign mi-
gration pacts with authoritarian governments which themselves suppress  political 
and/or social minorities. 
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